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NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant for
damages arising out of a power-outage occuring at Plaintiffs'
egg ranch in August of 19 73.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On April 5th through 7th, 1976, this case was tried to
a jury before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock.

Prior to trial

the Court ordered that the trial be bifurcated with liability
being first determined.

After presentation of Plaintiffs'/claims

of breach of contract, breach of warranty of fitness, strict
liability, res ipsa loquitur and third-party beneficiary liability.

The only remaining liability theory was that of negligence

and the case was submitted to the jury on that theory.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A special verdict was given to the jury and was
returned showing 10% negligence attributable to Defendants
and 90% negligence attributable to Plaintiffs*

Judgment on

the special verdict was entered by the Court on April 12,
19 76, in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs,
no cause of action•

It is from this judgment this appeal

has been taken.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the trial court's
decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent would disagree with many of the characterizations and statements made by the Appellants in their statement of facts.

Since this appeal is based solely on questions

of law, neither party has transcribed the majority of testimony so that no record references can be supplied except as
to the limited transcript requested.
Plaintiffs, Al Rigtrup, Mark Petersen, Bud Shepherd
and Leon Zeeman are individuals who formed a partnership known
as the Lake Shore Egg Ranch.

Defendant is a Utah corporation

with its principal place of business in Utah County and is a
public utility operating under the authority of the Public
Service Commission.

In the fall of 1972, Plaintiffs contacted
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Defendant and asked if power could be supplied to a new
building site of chicken coops near Lake Shore, Utah.
Defendants agents replied that such power could be supplied
and that Defendant would be pleased to do so.

During these

discussions Defendant informed Plaintiffs that a "threephase 7200 volt system" would ultimately be installed
area at some future time.

in the

At the present, however, Defendant

installed a single-phase 2400 volt line to the site and a
transformer was also installed within a week after this meeting.
The lines and the transformer were the property of the Defendant.
After these lines had been installed t Plaintiffs f
fy

electri-

cian installed the private electrical equipment needed to
operate the Plaintiffs 1 coop.

This equipment consisted of an

electrical line from the transformer to the weatherhead
("called a p i g - t a i l " ) , the weatherhead, a connecting
and wires to the meter base, a meter base

conduit

(but without the

m e t e r ) , a circuit breaker and wiring from the circuit breaker
to the coops.

Except for the meter which plugs into the meter

base and which was owned by Defendant, all of the equipment
beyond the transformer

(the point of delivery as defined in

the Electrical Service Regulations), was owned, installed and
maintained by the Plaintiffs.
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i

In January of 1973, Defendant's employee informed one
of the Plaintiffs that a stand-by power system should be provided by the Plaintiffs because 24-hour power could not be
guaranteed.

In April of 1973, the roof of the first chicken

coop which Plaintiffs built collapsed and killed 2,000 chickens.

*

In May of 19 73, a meeting was held between employees of the
Defendant and several of the Plaintiffs.

At this time, Defen-

i
dants informed Plaintiffs that they would install a 3-phase
7200 volt line to the coops because the company wanted to
equalize its entire system load.

This was not because of any

{

power inadequacy and Plaintiffs were assured that the power
supply of the present system would be sufficient to take care
of both coops.

During this meeting, however, Plaintiffs were

warned by Defendant's employee that Plaintiffs' own electrical
system would not be adequate to handle the full electrical
load drawn by two chicken coops.

In early June of that year

both coops went into full operation.
Shortly after the second coop was placed in operation,

I

Defendant installed a 25 KVA transformer to replace the 15 KVA
transformer since it had been shown the former transformer was

I
inadequate to handle the load being drawn by the two coops.
At this time, Defendant's employees discussed with Plaintiffs
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the necessity of having an emergency generator as well as
the inadequacy of Plaintiffs1 existing system.

On at least

two separate occasions Plaintiffs experienced power outages
because of an overload caused by their power usage.

At other

times the Defendant planned power outages for short periods
but notified Plaintiffs so preparations could be made.
In July of 19 73 an employee of Plaintiff's discovered
that the power had terminated and immediately contacted
Defendant which sent out crews within 10 to 15 minutes.

At

that time, Defendant's employees found that a portion of
Plaintiffs' electrical system had shorted out causing the
power failure.

Plaintiffs' employees were shown the broken

wires and was told that the system should be re-wired.
During this period, the work on the 7200 volt line had
commenced and was proceeding as rapidly as possible on an
intermittent basis towards the Plaintiffs' business.

During

this period of time, several conversations occurred between
Plaintiffs and Defendants concerning the completion of this
line but no definite date was ever given.

The Plaintiffs

could physically watch the construction of this system along
the road to their ranch and were aware of its progress at
all times.
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On August 9, 19 73, the accident giving rise to this
litigation occurred.

On that night, Mr. Petersen, Manager

t

and partner of the ranch, left the ranch at approximately
6:30 P.M. to visit his mother-in-law in the hospital.

He

returned home after 9:00 P.M. and found the power out.

He

'

contacted the Defendant and it immediately sent a repair
crew.

When .the crew arrived, it found that the wires in the

i
weatherhead portion of Plaintiffs1 electrical system had been
burned off causing the outage.

The power was restored in

approximately 20 minutes after the arrival of the crew.

4

Approximately 40,000 chickens were killed because of this
power outage.

At the time of the outage, Plaintiffs had

installed a generator system but had not installed the automatic transfer unit

activating it.

Also, Plaintiffs had no

alarm system at that time to warn of a loss of power.
Based upon this evidence, the jury returned a special
verdict stating that Plaintiffs were 90% negligent and
Defendant was 10% negligent and also finding that Plaintiff
had assumed the risk of not having adequate power.
ment was accordingly entered in favor of Defendant.
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A judg-

^

Plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial.

At the

hearing (R. 137-151) Plaintiffs argued that the assumption
of risk instructions were prejudicial, that their proposed
instructions should have been given, and that the exclusions
of exhibits were improper.

The trial court denied this

motion and stated during the hearing that there was probably
error in even submitting the case to the jury.

The Court

stated:
"I think there may have been some error in even
submitting it to the jury on negligence.
.

•

'

•

•

•

.

.

And Ifm just about convinced that the proximate
cause of this loss to the plaintiff was the
failure of the plaintiff to notify the company
that the power had gone out. Because it wasnft
the lack of power that electricuted the chickens
or anything of that nature, it was the fact that
the power didn't get turned on in time and the
chickens suffocated." (R. 145)

Thus, Plaintiffs were fortunate in even having their
case submitted to the jury on any theory in light of the strong
evidence against them and the rejection of all of their legal
liability theories by the trial court except for negligence.
The Plaintiffs1 attempt to find error from the jury
instructions relating to assumption of risk ignores the state
of the evidence and the strong mandate from the jury reflecting
the total futility of Plaintiffs1 claims.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ITS
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY REGARDING ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
Plaintiffs in their brief argue that the trial court
(

erred in instructing the jury on assumption of risk in light
of the 1973 comparative negligence statute, Section 78-27-37.
Plaintiffs argue further that the doctrine of assumption of

|

risk should be abolished under the new comparative negligence
standard.

These arguments are without merit.

The recent development of the comparative negligence
standard in many states has not had the effect upon the
doctrine of assumption of risk which Plaintiffs would lead
this Court to believe.

Some states have refused to recognize

contributory negligence and assumption of risk long before
comparative negligence was ever accepted.

The majority of

4

courts, however, recognize the distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk as is illustrated by

4
the following excerpt from an annotation dealing with this
subject:
Most of the courts take the view that while the
defenses of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence are closely associated, frequently
over-lapping, or shading into each other, and
often difficult to distinguish, the terms often
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being used interchangeably, nevertheless, the
two defenses should not be confused, they are
not synonomous, but independent, separate and
distinct defenses, which are not inconsistent
and may co-exist and be present in the same
case. The two defenses are based on different
theories." 82 A.L.R. 2d, 1218, 1229, "Distinction Between Assumption of Risk and Contributory
Negligence."
This Court has frequently recognized the difference
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk.

In

Ferguson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404 (Utah 1960), the Utah Court
recognized this distinction:
"Contributory negligence is based on carelessness,
inadvertence and unintended events, but assumption
of risk requires an intelligent and deliberate
choice to assume a known risk. Assumption of risk
requires knowledge by Plaintiff of a specific
defect or dangerous condition caused by Defendant's
negligence or lack of due care which Plaintiff
could have, but voluntarily and deliberately failed
to avoid and thereby assumed the risk of the injuries he sustained. On the other hand, contributory negligence requires evidence only that Plaintiff
failed to use the care for his own safety which an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would use
under the existing circumstances." Id. at 411.
The 19 73 statute states that:

"As used in this Act, contri-

butory negligence includes assumption of the risk."

Contrary

to Plaintiffs1 assertion, this language was obviously intended
to insure that assumption of the risk remain as a measure of
negligence in comparative cases.

Often, assumption of the risk

will be merged into contributory negligence but other times it
will remain distinct and separate.
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For example, in an automobile intersection collision/
the sole measure of negligence will be the negligence or
contributing negligence of each driver; assumption of the risk
would have no part in such a case.

On the other hand, however,

a strict liability or products case in which contributory

4

negligence is not a defense would involve entirely the misuse
or knowledge of a defect by the consumer and would necessarily

i
involve the measurement of that knowledge, i.e. the consumer's
assumption of the risk.

In that case, if the consumer's

negligence in assuming the risk was equal to or greater than

*

the danger created by the Defendant no recovery would be
allowed.

In the third type of case, such as the instant case,

elements of both active negligence and assumption of the risk
may be present in which case the jury must be instructed as to
the elements of each.
i
The trial court, in this case, carefully separated the
assumption of the risk instructions from the ordinary negligence
i

instructions and, in fact, no reference to negligence is made
in any of the assumption of risk instructions (12, 13 and 14).
It thus

must be assumed

that the jury based its 90% award
i

of negligence against Plaintiffs upon their failure to use

I
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ordinary and reasonable care and did not consider their
conduct in assuming a known risk.
In retrospect, the instructions on assumption of risk
and contributory negligence could have been combined to
allow the jury to conclude that Plaintiffs1 conduct in assuming the risk of the defective wiring and potential loss of
power constituted negligence which should have been weighed
in addition to the other elements of contributory negligence.
Had this been done, the jury would have been given even more
acts and omissions of Plaintiffs from which to conclude they
were in fact negligent.

Thus, the separation of the instructions

and the special verdict form actually was an advantage to
the Plaintiffs and a disadvantage to the Defendant.
It is apparent from the foregoing that negligence and
assumption of risk have distinctly different elements which need
to be considered.

Therefore, it must be presumed that the

legislature intended the elements of assumption of risk and
ordinary negligence to be considered by a jury in arriving at
its percentage determination.

The fact that assumption of risk

standards are used in determining elements of negligence does
not add undue influence to a Defendant's affirmative defenses
any more than it detracts from a Plaintiff's theory for
liability.

In both cases, the jury must weigh all factors
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on both sides in determining the negligence of the respective
parties.
In this case, the jury found that the Plaintiffs were
90% negligent in their conduct and additionally found that
they had assumed the risk of any loss.

Since the assumption

<

of the risk instructions did not refer to negligence and
since the special interrogatory on assumption was separate,
i
subsequent; and apart from the negligence interrogatory it is
clear that even if it were error to instruct on assumption of
risk that such error was not prejudicial.

j

As stated by this Court in Simpson v. General Motors
Corporation, 470 P.2d 399 (Utah 1970):
"The parties have had a full and fair opportunity
to present their evidence in arguments upon the
issues to the Court and the jury, who after due
consideration and deliberation have made their
determinations thereon. This is the objective
•
of a trial. When it has been accomplished, the
administering of even-handed justice to both
sides demands that there should be some solidarity
in the result so it can be relied upon. Accordingly, the established rule is that all presumptions favor the validity of the verdict and the
judgment; and they will not be over-turned unless
the attacker shows that there is error which is
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there
is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence
the result would have been different." Id. at 40 2.
The jury had ample evidence to find negligence on the
part of the Plaintiffs regardless of the doctrine of assumption
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€

fl

of risk.

The Plaintiffs failed to use proper wiring for the

power supply of their chicken coops and failed to provide
for emergency generators or power outage alarm systems.

Such

action showed that Plaintiffs failed to use ordinary and
reasonable care which a prudent person would have done under
the existing circumstances regardless of any knowledge
Plaintiffs had of any specific defect.
It should also be borne in mind that the special
interrogatories allow the judge latitude in interpreting
any inconsistency which the jury may have found and was free
to accept or disregard any such inconsistency.

In this case,

the trial court didn't have to rule at all because the jury's
answer to the negligence questions rendered the assumption of
risk question moot.
For these reasons, the submission of the jury instructions combined with the special interrogatories did not consti
tute reversible error.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
EXHIBIT 33 AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the trial court erred
by failing to admit a copy of Rules and Regulations of the
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<

Public Service Commission governing an electric utility
company.

Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court should

<

have given instructions to the jury on the applicable rules
of the Public Service Commission.

A review of these regula-

i
tions as compared with the pleadings of Plaintiffs show that
no error was committed.
Section 58-36-21 quoted by Appellants (page 14, Appellant's
Brief) is inapplicable to Defendant since there was no showing
that its equipment was unsafe or did not meet the National
Electric Code.

If anything, this section would apply to

Plaintiffs1 own electrician who installed and maintained the
malfunctioning equipment on Plaintiffs' part of the service
line.
Likewise, Rule 11 is unapplicable to this case.

In

brief, this rule is concerned with: (1) maintenance of the
power companies' side of the system; (2) reporting defective
equipment to the Public Service Commission or local authorities and? (3) furnishing to the user reasonable assistance
and information regarding maintenance of the customer's system.
In the instant case, it was not the Defendant's equipment that failed but rather that of the Plaintiffs'.

Plain-

tiffs did not plead any negligence on the part of Defendant
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in failing to report potentially defective wiring to the
Commission nor was there any showing that such a report
would have any effect whatsoever upon the loss.

Finally,

there was no evidence that reasonable assistance and information was not always given to the Plaintiffs by the Defendant.
Consequently, the trial court was correct in refusing to
admit the regulations into evidence, inasmuch as they had no
applicability to the loss and would have been merely irrelevant and immaterial surplusage.

Even an examination of the

annotation cited by Plaintiffs (Plaintiffs1 Brief, page 16)
reveals that the safety codes or standards must be relevant
and applicable to the alleged negligent conduct of a
defendant in order to be admissable.

CONCLUSION
The instructions to the jury on assumption of risk
by the trial court did not unfairly prejudice the Appellants
but, in fact, reduced the acts or omissions upon which the
jury could have concluded that Plaintiffs were contributorily
negligent.

The careful separation of the assumption of risk

instructions from those of negligence and the separation and
sequence of the question in the verdict prevented any prejudice
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from occuring.

Even if it were assumed arguendo that the

interrogatory improperly inquired concerning assumption of
risk, such an error would clearly be harmless since the jury
had already concluded that Plaintiffs were 90% negligent
without considering the assumption of the risk elements.
Finally, the trial court properly excluded regulations and statutes which were irrelevant to the issues plead
and the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs.
For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the trial
court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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